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A Sovereign Wealth Turn
Anna Gelpern *

I.

Introduction: Enter GAPP

The Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) for sovereign wealth funds will
debut at the annual meetings of the Bretton Woods institutions next month. The dry
acronym evokes fading accounting conventions; 1 it belies the document’s importance as
a political and institutional milestone on the way to what might become international
financial architecture. This is so even regardless of its contents, which at this writing
remain to be revealed.

A working group of major sovereign wealth funds supported by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) negotiated GAPP, also called the Santiago Principles, over the
summer. 2 If the principles succeed – if they target behavior that governments, markets,
and people in home and host countries think important; if they are concrete enough to
assess compliance; and if they do in fact prompt compliance with credible reputational
sanctions or indirect enforcement – they will advance the project of financial integration,
and recast the role of the IMF on the new financial landscape. If they fail, the failure will
expose the challenges of integration more starkly, and reinforce doubts about the
relevance of the twentieth-century institutional framework.

GAPP architects face a tall order because integration today goes beyond opening borders
to trade and investment. It entails assimilating public capital in private markets on a vast
scale, dealing with new forms of financial organization, and marrying financial systems
*

Rutgers University School of Law—Newark. I am grateful to Tom Callaghy, Giselle Datz, Kevin Davis,
Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Sky Julian, Brad Setser, Edwin M. Truman, and Matt Tubin for detailed comments on
earlier drafts, to Kelly Targett for excellent research assistance, and to the Dean’s Fund at Rutgers—
Newark for financial support.
1
Bob Davis, Foreign Funds Agree to Set of Guiding Principles, WALL STREET J., Sept. 3, 2008, at C1.
See, e.g., Press Release No. 08/04, International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, International
Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds Reaches a Preliminary Agreement on Draft Set Generally
Accepted Principles and Practices-“Santiago Principles” (Sept. 2, 2008), available at http://www.iwgswf.org/pr/swfpr0804.htm.
2
See id.
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premised on very different ideas about the role of the state in the economy. The task of
governing global finance goes beyond rearranging the chairs and shares on the Bretton
Woods decks, beyond getting the right Gs in the G-X, and beyond getting Basel right. It
is about making coherent, legitimate, and accountable a patchwork of public laws, private
codes, bureaucratic networks and institutional remnants left in last century’s wake. 3
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) – pools of public money active in the private markets –
uniquely embody the predicament.

This essay begins with an overview of the SWF controversy, then maps a four-part
governance challenge for the funds. The GAPP exercise responds to this challenge. It
brings together key new players in a policy coordination forum, and in a substantive, nonhierarchical relationship with the IMF. Countries that had played a limited role in
shaping the norms of international finance have taken the lead writing the rules. In doing
so, they have had to negotiate domestic and external demands, and reconcile very
different visions of the state’s role in the private markets. Time will tell whether this rare
process achievement would alter the governance landscape in durable ways.

II.

A Species in Context

SWFs grew from a few million to nearly $3 trillion in assets under management (not
including state pension funds), surpassing hedge funds in just a few years, and projected
to triple by 2013. This growth is part of a broader pattern of capital flows. For the past
decade, states on the periphery saved, and states in the center spent at a growing pace.
U.S. deficits ballooned while China, Russia and oil-producing states in the Middle East
among others accumulated trillions of dollars from export revenues and keeping down the
value of their currencies. The accumulation initially took the form of government
purchases of U.S. Treasury and agency securities. Then came the surge in SWF
investments in Europe and the United States, along with a surge in other overseas activity
by non-traditional investors, such as China’s state-owned enterprises and development

3

Kevin E. Davis, Global Governance of Development Finance? (Mar. 5, 2008) (unpublished manuscript on
file with author).
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agencies buying into African infrastructure and extraction. To date, SWFs have lagged
far behind official foreign exchange reserves; 4 they are expected to overtake reserves in
the next five years. 5
Although the SWF form has existed for decades, the funds’ recent growth6 marks a
qualitative shift in their role. SWFs are unlike traditional central bank reserves, because
their investments are not limited to liquid, low-risk securities. They are unlike traditional
state-owned enterprises because they do not normally operate their investment targets;
most claim to seek passive portfolio investment. About forty states have SWFs; twothirds are less than ten years old. 7 Some, such as Singapore’s venerable Temasek,
Norway’s Government Pension Fund-Global, and the brand new China Investment
Corporation (CIC), are in the news every day. Others like Botswana’s Pula Fund are
rarely mentioned. 8 Most of the older funds are from small, rich states in Asia and the
Middle East, such as Singapore and Abu Dhabi; newer ones tend to come from larger,
poorer states like China and Russia. 9

When writing about SWFs, it is de rigueur to highlight their diversity: some are formed
to offset commodity price swings, some save for future generations, others are essentially
pension funds, yet others are simply out to make a buck. This makes for very different
policy constraints, funding and investment profiles. The diversity is relevant in two
4

BRAD W. SETSER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH AND SOVEREIGN POWER 10
(2008), available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/17074/sovereign_wealth_and_sovereign_power.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpub
lication%2Fby_type%2Fspecial_report [hereinafter “SETSER REPORT”]. See also Brad Setser, It Is 2004
All Over Again: Central Banks Haven’t Shifted Away from Safe, Liquid Assets, BRAD SETSER: FOLLOW
THE MONEY, http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/06/23/it-is-2004-all-over-again-central-banks-havent-shiftedaway-from-safe-liquid-assets/#more-3615 (June 23, 2008, 11:06 a.m.).
5
See John Lipsky, First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund at the seminar ,
Sovereign Funds: Responsibility with Our Future organized by the Ministry of Finance of Chile (Sept. 3,
2008), text as prepared for delivery available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/090308.htm.
6
See id.
7
See id.
8
For a comparison of sovereign wealth funds including the Pula Fund, see Edwin M. Truman, A Blueprint
for Sovereign Wealth Fund Best Practices, Policy Brief (Peterson Institute for International Economics),
Apr. 2008, available at http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/pb/pb08-3.pdf.
9
See SETSER REPORT, supra note 4, at 7. See also Brad Setser, China Buys, Norway Sells, BRAD SETSER:
FOLLOW THE MONEY, http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/09/09/china-buys-norway-sells/ (Sept. 9, 2008 , 10:20
p.m.).
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ways. First, the funds may find it difficult to coordinate among themselves. Second, it is
hard to devise a unified policy fix for something that is not a unified phenomenon. But it
is the basic features shared by most SWFs that have excited the public and academic
interest: they are huge, they are controlled by governments, and they play in markets
where governments had not played before on a large scale, most notably, equity. 10
SWFs’ size makes them important. Sovereign control raises the specter of political
intervention, and may make it easier for the funds to change form, objective, and
investment strategy: profit will drive them … until it does not. SWFs’ appearance on
new turf tests the adequacy of regulation and market structures.

Public debate about SWFs began in earnest in 2007, and it began badly. In the United
States, SWF acquisitions came on the heels of mishandled attempts by state-owned
companies (not SWFs) from China and the Persian Gulf to buy into U.S. oil and port
facilities, and roughly coincided with the start of the credit crisis. 11 Nevertheless, SWFs
hit a raw nerve because they represented all the scary news at once: the color-coded
security alerts, Wall Street’s desperate hunt for capital, the failure of regulation, the
decline of 20th century international institutions, and massive concentration of wealth in
the hands of not-necessarily democratic, not-entirely capitalist, and not-altogether
friendly governments. Calls for severe investment restrictions came naturally, framed in
terms of sovereignty and national security. 12 The equally predictable protests against
protectionism followed. 13 Two years later, policy middle ground was well-settled. New

10

But note that to date, SWF equity investments have been relatively small, while reserve investments in
equity becoming more common. See, e.g., WILLIAM MIRACKY ET AL., ASSESSING THE RISKS: THE
BEHAVIORS OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 7 (June 2008), available at
http://www.monitor.com/Portals/0/MonitorContent/documents/Monitor_SWF_report_final.pdf (noting that
in 2007, SWFs invested $92 billion in equity transactions); SETSER REPORT, supra note 4, at __ (noting
that an official survey in 2007 “revised Chinese debt purchases up by about $70 billion, and official
purchase of debt up by $100 billion. Counting equities, Chinese purchases were revised up by close to $90
billion and total official purchases by around $130 billion.”)
11
Katharina Pistor, Global Network Finance 2-8 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n. 18th Annual Meeting, Working
Paper No. 54, 2008), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2611&context=alea.
12
Evan Bayh, Time for Sovereign Wealth Rules, WALL STREET J., Feb. 13, 2008, at A26.
13
DAVID M. MARCHICK & MATTHEW J. SLAUGHTER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, GLOBAL FDI
POLICY: CORRECTING A PROTECTIONIST DRIFT 10 (2008), available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16503/.
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law made minor tweaks to the open investment framework established in the 1980s, 14
while U.S. officials preached transparency and made SWFs promise to act
commercially. 15 The United States was not alone: other hosts went through similar
debates. 16

Law reform did not lay controversy to rest. SWFs turned out to be bigger than the
national security-open investment quarrel that had trapped them. They came to embody
the power shifts and culture clashes of financial integration, which, thanks to capital flow
reversals, no longer looked like a simple exercise to reshape the world in the AngloAmerican image.

III.

Serving Many Masters

Governing SWFs – and being governed by them – must begin by understanding to whom
they answer, deciding to whom they should answer, and finding a way to resolve the
inevitable conflicts among SWFs’ constituencies at home and abroad. SWFs as a group
are a jumble of contradictions and a heap of new paradigms: public money that pledges
to act as if it were private, vast pools of capital that promise not to move markets, noncontrolling investors that run centrally controlled economies; and public fiduciaries that
balk at corporate governance of their investment targets.

SWFs are not unique for juggling conflicting demands. Public-private hybrids like
government-sponsored enterprises (for example, Fannie Mae, R.I.P. 1968-2008) must
14

Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (“FINSA”), Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246
(2007) (amending § 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (“DPA”)). The amendment included
stricter requirements for state-controlled investments.
15
See e.g., Robert M. Kimmitt, Public Footprints in Private Markets: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the
World Economy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jan./Feb. 2008), available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87109/robert-m-kimmitt/public-footprints-in-privatemarkets.html [hereinafter “Kimmitt Public Footprints”]; Clay Lowery, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs, The Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Global Economy, Remarks
at Barclays Capital’s 12th Annual Global Inflation-Linked Conference (Feb. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp836.htm; U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, U.S. FACT SHEET: FOURTH CABINET-LEVEL MEETING OF THE U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC ECONOMIC
DIALOGUE 2-3 (June 18, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/sedusfactsheet.pdf.
16
MARCHICK & SLAUGHTER, supra note 13, at 7-12.
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reconcile duties to their shareholders with duties to the public. 17 Transnational hybrids,
such as SWFs, have another dimension with which to contend: they must answer to
constituencies both at home and abroad. 18 In all, SWFs face a four-fold accountability
challenge.

First, there is public internal accountability, which must be achieved within the political
system of the capital-exporting state. As government institutions, SWFs must further
domestic public purpose. The state may be democratic, in which case SWFs answer to
elected officials, or not, in which case they might answer to the monarch and her five
cousins. China’s CIC, established in September 2007 with $200 billion from central
bank reserves, reports directly to the State Council. Its board is made up of officials from
powerful government agencies. 19 CIC appears to have at least two public missions: to
reform the Chinese banking sector and to boost returns on foreign exchange reserves. 20
Influential observers in the Chinese press debate other public goals, including fiscal
stabilization and growing export markets. 21 Each potentially implies a very different
investment strategy; reconciling them is a matter for the Chinese political system, with
critical implications for the rest of the world. 22
17

See A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 562-574
(1995).
18
See Ashby H.B. Monk, Recasting the Sovereign Wealth Fund Debate: Organizational Legitimacy,
Institutional Governance and Geopolitics 4-6 (Centre for Employment, Work & Finance, Oxford
University Centre for the Environment Working Paper, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134862.
19
Brad W. Setser, What to Do With Over Half a Trillion a Year? Understanding the Changes in the
Management of China’s Foreign Assets, RGE MONITOR, Jan. 18, 2008, available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/15294/what_to_do_with_over_a_half_a_trillion_a_year_understanding_the
_changes_in_the_management_of_chinas_foreign_assets.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F8937%2Fbrad_
w_setser%3Fgroupby%3D3%26hide%3D1%26id%3D8937%26filter%3D2008; see also MICHAEL F.
MARTIN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CHINA’S SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND 26 (2008), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34337.pdf.
20
China’s state-owned bank holding company was recently made a subsidiary of CIC, further confusing the
mission. ChinaStakes.com, A Simmering CIC-Huijin Separation, July 8, 2008,
http://www.chinastakes.com/story.aspx?id=495 (last visited Sept. 14, 2008)
21
Ashby H.B. Monk, Scott Moore & Xunyi ‘Jane’ Xu, A Review of Chinese Language Literature on
Sovereign Wealth Funds 11-12 (Oxford International Review Sovereign Wealth Funds Team Working
Paper No. SWF001, 2008), available at http://oxfordir.files.wordpress.com/2008/07/swf001.pdf.
22
Recent administrative restructuring brought a number of Chinese banks under CIC control. This raised
prudential concerns in the United States when several of the banks sought to establish operations in New
York. Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and
Technology, and the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises,

6
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Second, private internal accountability refers to SWFs’ duties to narrower constituencies,
such as shareholders, derived from their charters. Public and private internal
accountability may conflict where, for example, a fund established to save for old age is
used to advance unrelated strategic goals. 23 Transparency can expose internal
accountability tensions. A transparent SWF seeking to maximize return on investment
may have to forego opportunities in politically unpopular sectors or countries to secure
domestic legitimacy. 24

Third, public external accountability implies a duty of state-owned funds to adhere to
international norms. Acting as a market participant should not absolve the state of its
basic public duties: 25 for example, not to fund genocide. Norwegian officials point to
public international norms, such as the U.N. Global Compact, as well as domestic
procedural safeguards, to defend their SWF’s ethical guidelines and its shunning of WalMart. 26

But how far does this duty to the system run? When observers extol SWFs’ role as
“patient capital” serving financial stability, does it follow that SWFs must refrain from
aggressive trading? When the United States asks China to invest commercially, 27 does it
expect CIC to hold U.S. financial stocks in a credit crunch? Iceland thought so when it
caught Norway short-selling its bank shares in 2006. 28 Here too transparency is a bone
of contention: failure to disclose SWF positions can impede macroeconomic surveillance
Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 5, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/alvarez20080305a.htm; Jamil Anderlini & Geoff
Dyer, US Delays Licenses to Top Chinese Banks, FT.com, Jun. 16, 2008, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4dc9a06c-3bcb-11dd-9cb2-0000779fd2ac.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2008).
23
In what is likely a more common scenario, Norway’s SWF has financed the government beyond the
limits established by its internal guidelines. Truman, supra note 8, at 9.
24
Steven Schwarzman, Reject Sovereign Wealth Funds at Your Peril, FT.com, Jun. 20, 2008, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/405b8888-3dff-11dd-b16d-0000779fd2ac.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2008).
25
Cf. Lebron v. Nat’l R. R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) (making a similar argument in the U.S.
domestic context).
26
Kristin Halvorsen, Norwegian Minister of Finance, speech at the 2008 OECD Forum on Climate Change,
Growth, Stability, Sovereign Wealth Funds (June 3-4, 2008), transcript available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/57/40760305.pdf, at 2-3.
27
See supra note 15. Similar agreements were reached with Singapore and Abu Dhabi.
28
Asset-Backed Insecurity, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2008, at 386, available at
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10533428.
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and potentially unsettle the markets; disclosure can put SWFs at a disadvantage to wholly
private competitors, such as hedge funds, and other SWFs. 29

Fourth, private external accountability refers to SWFs’ duties as creditors and
shareholders, which they may owe their investment targets under host country laws. For
the most part, SWFs are already bound by these laws simply by virtue of the investment:
for example, they may not engage in insider trading or self-dealing. The worry is that
SWFs might simply flout the laws when it becomes expedient, on the assumption that
being sovereign, they can escape sanction. In this context, extracting SWF promises to
abide by the laws 30 seems feckless: such promises hardly solve the underlying
commitment problem. Proposals to deprive SWFs of shareholder voting rights 31 do
address commitment, but may have little practical impact: votes matter less when you can
phone the CEO, or when all else fails, the Finance Minister. Governments’ capacity to
exert influence and get information through private channels is a central concern with
sovereign investments; modifying formal voting rules avoids the issue. The normative
assumptions behind voting proposals also merit a closer look. Is disenfranchising public
shareholders (and thereby empowering the rest) good for corporate governance? Does it
serve government accountability in the home country? More cynically, is depriving
Russia of a formal shareholder vote worth giving up Norway’s or California pension
funds’ leverage on human rights?

This four-part typology is simplified. It is also descriptive. Reconciling tensions among
the four basic categories requires agreement on norms.

IV.

After MAI, Beyond CFIUS, the IMF Rides Again?

A year ago, there was no obvious forum to negotiate norms to govern SWFs. Domestic
debates in host states were stuck in the sovereignty-protectionism rut. With its power to
29

Press Conference Call Transcript No. 08/01, International Working group of Sovereign Wealth Funds
(Sept. 2, 2008), available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/tr.htm; see also Halvorsen, supra note 26, at 1-2.
30
See Lowery, supra note 15; Kimmett Public Footprints, supra note 15.
31
Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1352 (2008), available at
http://lawreview.stanford.edu/content/vol60/issue5/GilsonMilhaupt.pdf.
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block transactions that threaten national security, the Committee on Foreign Investment
in the United States (CFIUS) had gone from obscurity to celebrity, became an emblem of
the controversy over sovereign investment, and inspired imitators around the world. 32
SWF sponsors saw this trend as both an economic and a political threat. To the people at
home, SWFs stood for economic security, political autonomy and global prestige. Even
in states where the masses had little knowledge and no influence over how public money
was invested, governments could lose face by making too many concessions to host
country fears.

The leading broker of international investment norms, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), had not recovered global credibility after the
failure of its Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the 1990s. 33 Back then, the
OECD faced criticism as an exclusive club dominated by wealthy capital exporters in
Europe and North America. In an ironic turn, it is now formulating best practices for
hosting SWFs. 34

The IMF was both a natural and an unlikely alternative candidate to come up with norms
to govern SWFs. Its macroeconomic and financial stability expertise made the IMF
uniquely credible in addressing issues of deep concern to home and host states alike. It
knew all the actors involved 35 and had analyzed the advent of SWFs for some time. 36
Unlike the OECD, the Fund’s membership is nearly universal, though its internal
governance remains controversial even after a round of reforms to give more voice to the

32

A description of CFIUS authority and activities is available on the website for the United States
Department of the Treasury. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS),
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/cfius/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2008).
33
Attempts to revive multilateral investment negotiations at the World Trade Organization after MAI’s
collapse also failed.
34
Press Release, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, OECD Countries Stay Open
to Commercial Investments by Sovereign Wealth Funds (Sept. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3343,en_2649_201185_40409737_1_1_1_1,00.html.
35
NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND THEIR BORROWERS 4 (2006)
(linking the IMF’s policy influence and its long-standing relationships with world governments).
36
See, e.g., generally, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT (Apr.
2007).
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erstwhile periphery. 37 The IMF has jurisdiction over its members’ exchange rate
policies, current account convertibility, and broad macroeconomic and financial policy
responsibility. However, its authority over capital flows, including investment, is partial,
ambiguous, and worse for wear since the capital account crises of the 1990s and early
2000s. 38 The Fund’s recent track record with policy surveillance has been mixed at
best. 39 It did little to reduce the imbalances that spawned the new wave of SWFs: it
could no more influence U.S. tax policy than China’s exchange rate management.

In a compromise, the IMF got tagged at its 2007 Annual Meetings to help leading SWFs
distil “best practices” for going about their business.40 Prodded by the G-7, the IMF
envisaged something along the lines of its prior forays into best practices for fiscal
transparency and reserve management. 41 Yet the new project was quite different. The
IMF did not come to the table with authority to determine the standards, assess
compliance, or sanction noncompliance, with the result. It dealt with states that by
definition did not need its money and were unlikely to need it in the foreseeable future.
The IMF’s functions were expert, convening, and secretarial. The output was
emphatically voluntary; 42 it may not even rate as soft law. 43 Meanwhile, reports on
SWFs’ enthusiasm for the exercise were not encouraging. Soon after receiving the
assignment, one IMF official observed that the “best” in “best practices” was too
controversial. He was right – to a point.

37

Press Release, International Monetary Fund, Directors Back Reforms to Overhaul IMF Quotas and Voice
(Mar. 28, 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/NEW032808A.htm.
38
See e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OFFICE, THE IMF’S APPROACH
TO CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION 3 (2005) available at http://www.ieoimf.org/eval/complete/pdf/04202005/report.pdf.
39
BUREAU OF INT’L AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND’S 2007 DECISION OF SURVEILLANCE OVER MEMBERS’ POLICIES
2 (2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/82808report.pdf. (stating that the
IMF’s “implementation of the new decision can be viewed as mixed.”).
40
Press Release No. 08/78, International Monetary Fund, Communiqué of the International Monetary and
Financial Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (Apr. 12, 2008,
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/pr0878.htm.
41
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS—A WORK AGENDA 22 (Feb. 29, 2008)
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf.
42
See Press Conference Call Transcript, supra note 29.
43
For a description of soft law, see Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J.
INT’L L 291, 319-22 (2006).
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V.

Behind the New Acronyms

An International Working Group (IWG) made up of two dozen or so state with SWFs 44
negotiated GAPP between May and September 2008. They met three times, in
Washington, Singapore and Chile, with a drafting session in Norway. The group was
chaired by two senior officials, one from the world’s largest SWF, the Abu Dhabi
Investment Authority, and another from the IMF. Several home and host countries, along
with representatives of the OECD, the World Bank, and the European Union, attended
IWG meetings as observers. The agreement was announced at the meeting in Santiago
on September 2, 2008. The Santiago Principles did not claim to be the “best,” but they
did aspire to be “generally accepted” by home and host constituencies. 45 IWG member
governments are expected to sign off on the Santiago text before October 11, when it
would be presented to the IMF’s policy-setting International Monetary and Financial
Committee (IMFC) and the general IMF membership. 46 A ritual welcome will follow.

What is known about GAPP’s scope and structure puts the principles in the analytical
mainstream, but says little about the underlying norms and politics. Speeches and press
statements surrounding the IWG announcement reveal concern with SWFs’ place in
home countries’ policy mix, a shared sense of their public role in promoting financial
stability, and recognition that SWFs’ decision-making is poorly understood and
worrisome to hosts – but also suspicion on the part of many funds that they operate on
hostile, unfamiliar turf that may tilt in favor of private and public competitors. The IWG
product wants to reassure, but not at the expense of losing autonomy or competitive edge.

44

According to the IWG website,
The IWG member countries are: Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Canada,
Chile, China, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Ireland, South Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico,
New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Singapore, Timor-Leste, Trinidad & Tobago, the
United Arab Emirates, and the United States. Oman, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, the OECD,
and the World Bank, participate as permanent observers.
Press Release No. 08/04, supra note 1.
45
[Cf. the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in the United States, except that they are giving way
to International Accounting Standards.]
46
Press Conference Call Transcript, supra note 29.
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The two dozen principles address the structure and objectives of SWFs (“legal,
institutional and macroeconomic” factors), their governance and accountability
arrangements (especially decision autonomy from the home government) and their
investment and risk management policies, focusing on financial stability. 47 This framing
is broadly in line with earlier pronouncements by the G-7, and consistent with the
comprehensive “Blueprint for SWF Best Practices” proposed by Edwin M. Truman at the
Peterson Institute. 48 Detailed comparisons will be illuminating.

The Blueprint and the accompanying scoreboard are rare in the SWF literature for
stressing accountability in home and host countries alike. They use a four-pronged
assessment of Structure, Governance, Transparency and Accountability, and Behavior.
For all four prongs, the principal device to achieve accountability is disclosure; arm’s
length dealing is another recurring theme. While the need for accountability is universal,
the use of disclosure and arm’s length dealing to achieve it is less so. As a matter of
public internal accountability, some systems might prefer substantive regulation (specific
approval of investments or prohibition of bad practices); yet others would focus on
procedural safeguards and administrative controls. Internal accountability may also
argue against separating politics from arm’s length commerce. 49 It is certainly plausible
to argue that disclosure is the better way to satisfy both internal and external
accountability demands; it has been gaining strength as a norm in the international
financial system. 50 But as Truman points out, many SWF governments were not
involved in designing the system and believe, along with their citizens, that they have no

47

Id.
Truman, supra note 8. The Blueprint includes public pension funds in the definition of SWFs. These
generally score better than non-pension SWFs (although some non-pension SWFs score equally well). It is
possible that pension funds enjoy a greater public perception as “other people’s money” – funds belonging
to a defined constituency, rather than taxpayers at large – that entails a higher burden of accountability to
the owners.
49
See, generally, Monk et al., supra note 21 (discussing debates in China).
50
See Press Release, supra note 37; International Monetary Fund Legal Department, Selected Decisions
and Selected Documents of the IMF, Thirtieth Issue—Summing Up by the Acting Chairman-Standards for
the Dissemination of Economic and Financial Statistics to the Public by Member Countries and
Implementation of the SDDS [Special Data Dissemination Standard] (2006),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sd/index.asp?decision=EBM/96/36, (arguing that “comprehensive
economic and financial data, disseminated on a timely basis, are essential to the transparency of
macroeconomic performance and policy.”).
48
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stake in it. 51 The Santiago Principles will expose the extent to which the new players buy
into the system’s way of achieving accountability, or try to bring global norms more in
line with their domestic norms.

Implementation will be similarly revealing. When IWG announced agreement on the
Santiago Principles, its members were at pains to disassociate them from the IMF
surveillance process: they insisted that everything about the principles was voluntary.
Perhaps as a matter of preemption, the Santiago Principles incorporate a periodic internal
review mechanism. 52 In theory, nothing prevents the IMF from considering GAPP
criteria in its assessment of home and host policies implicating SWFs, just as nothing
prevents a host government from using GAPP as part of its investment screen. But doing
so may undermine the Santiago Principles’ legitimacy in the home countries, and scuttle
cooperation between new and old powers and institutions.

In all, the final product contains elements of several established species: best practices
produced by and for the public sector (for example, IMF on fiscal transparency),
corporate codes of conduct produced by the private sector to regulate itself, and
principles jointly produced by public and private actors to regulate private conduct (for
example, the Equator Principles, a collaboration between private banks and the
International Finance Corporation). GAPP would be unusual because the principles are
produced by and for public entities, yet they purport to regulate market activity. 53 Since
reaching agreement on the principles, IWG has released a SWF survey, answering calls
for transparency while seizing initiative and asserting control in a field where

51

Edwin M. Truman, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy,
Trade and Technology, Financial Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives 6 (Sept. 10, 2008)
[hereinafter “Truman Testimony”] available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/truman091008.pdf.
52
Press Conference Call Transcript, supra note 29.
53
Compare INSTITUTE OF INT’L FINANCE, INC., PRINCIPLES FOR STABLE CAPITAL FLOWS AND FAIR DEBT
RESTRUCTURING IN EMERGING MARKETS (2005), available at
http://www.iif.com/download.php?id=4fyB5BGIKzU.
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authoritative information is scarce and getting more so. 54 Governments as market actors 55
seem to favor self-regulation.

Among the most interesting aspects of the IWG exercise is the group’s decision to stick
around. SWFs that had started as reluctant participants “agreed to explore the creation of
a standing group” to provide ongoing review of the Santiago Principles. Such a standing
group could naturally become a forum for policy coordination, although it is hard to
predict its remit. Because of the SWFs’ hybrid character, the potential models range
from the G-7 (monetary policy) to OPEC (a producers’ cartel). Regardless of the model,
any new body would coordinate with the IMF, the various Gs and regional groupings.

It bodes well for IWG’s future that its efforts on GAPP have outstripped the OECD’s
work with SWF hosts. Competing funds that have never worked together before
managed to come up with what appears to be a detailed, operational code of conduct in a
matter of months. To date, the OECD – an organization of mainly wealthy states that
have worked together for decades – has produced general guidelines grounded in its
existing instruments; best practices will come in 2009. 56 The interim product has little
operational guidance for host authorities, and does not appear to have constrained them. 57

SWF and other sovereign investments raise many complex regulatory questions for the
hosts: should governments be allowed to vote their stock like private shareholders? 58
Should SWFs enjoy tax breaks for governments? 59 Can national securities regulators

54

Sovereign Wealth Funds: Current Institutional and Operational Practices (Sep. 15, 2008), available at
http://iwg-swf.org/pubs/swfsurvey.pdf. SETSER REPORT, supra note 4, at 40 (noting a decline in
transparency).
55
See, generally, Giselle Datz, Governments as Market Players: New Forms of State Competition,
Adaptation and Innovation in the Global Economy (Oct. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author); Eric Helleiner & Troy Lundblad, States Markets and Sovereign Wealth Funds, GERMAN POLICY
STUDIES (forthcoming Fall 2008).
56
See Letter from Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary-General, to G7 Finance Ministers, (Apr. 4, 2008), with
accompanying report of the OECD INVESTMENT COMMITTEE, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND RECIPIENT
COUNTRY POLICIES 6 (Apr. 4, 2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/9/40408735.pdf.
57
Truman Testimony, supra note 51, at 16-18.
58
Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at [10-11].
59
Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009).
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adequately discipline states for offenses such as insider trading? 60 Should bank-owning
SWFs be subject to supervision and activities restrictions to safeguard national banking
systems and deposit insurance schemes? 61 The OECD may or may not be the best forum
to coordinate approaches to these issues, but for now, the answers will surface ad-hoc.

VI.

Conclusion: Why It Matters

In 1952, the top lawyer at the State Department informed his counterpart at the Justice
Department that the United States would no longer support sovereign claims of absolute
immunity in U.S. court cases involving commercial activity by another state. The law
was keeping pace with the international economy:

[L]ittle support has been found except on the part of the Soviet Union and its
satellites for continued full acceptance of the absolute theory of sovereign
immunity. … The reasons which obviously motivate state trading countries in
adhering to the theory with perhaps increasing rigidity are most persuasive that
the United States should change its policy. … [T]he department feels that the
widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments engaging in
commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing
business with them to have their rights determined in the courts. 62
The United States was responding to state-owned commerce from the Soviet bloc.
Operating “not as a regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player within
it” 63 exposed states to lawsuits in U.S. federal courts.
60

Chairman Christopher Cox, Chairman of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Keynote Address
and Robert B. Glauber Lecture at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, entitled
The Role of Governments in Markets (Oct. 24, 2007), at Schedule B, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407cc.htm.
61
Alvarez, supra note 22. A Chinese state-owned holding company that owns two Chinese banks was
transferred to the China Investment Corporation, a SWF, as a result of an internal reorganization. The
banks are seeing to establish a U.S. presence. The U.S. Federal Reserve argues that the reorganization
should subject the SWF to the strictures of the U.S. Bank Holding Company Act, which could severely
restrict the Fund’s activities. Anderlini & Dyer, supra note 22. Conditional approval has since been
granted.
62
Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Acting Attorney General Philip
B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T STATE BULL 984, 984–85 (1952).
63
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992). However, an activity that may be
private for foreign sovereign immunity purposes may be public in other areas of the law: Argentina’s
market borrowing is patently commercial; Kentucky’s is “quintessentially public”. Dept. of Revenue of
Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1810 (2008). Identity matters.
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The commercial activity exception to sovereign immunity was from the start a way of
mediating U.S. interaction with countries that held different views of the state’s role in
the economy. But because the dominant mode of interaction between the United States
and the Soviet Union in 1952 was trade, the way the Soviets organized their internal
affairs was unimportant – the new exception to sovereign immunity would help level the
playing field for U.S. firms, not manage their acquisition by the Soviet state.

Fifty years later, with a new wave of large-scale sovereign investment, hereto irrelevant
details of how other states run their economies have become critical. Conflicting
accountability demands arise more often and in more legal fields, including corporate,
banking, tax and securities. To rephrase Justice Scalia, SWFs operate both as regulators
of the market and as private players within it. 64 The concern goes far beyond SWFs,
whose investment strategies have been largely passive to date. 65 Outsize debt holdings
by foreign central banks, notably China’s, 66 and infrastructure acquisitions by stateowned enterprises, notably Russia’s, 67 reveal a new level of interdependence among
systems that have little in common otherwise. Brazil, China, Norway, Qatar and the
United States mix public and private in different ways. When their hybrids go global,
they reshape the law and structure of global finance. 68

The Santiago project may be a preview of this structure. It may help establish a new role
for the IMF in financial diplomacy: a shift from the hard power of conditionality in the
20th century to the soft power of persuasion and expertise in the 21st. In the world of soft
power, brokering compromise on sovereign investment is a big step up from technical
assistance. IWG may launch a new policy coordination regime among key actors who
had trouble taking center stage in the 20th century institutional framework. Ad-hoc,

64

Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614; see Datz supra note 55 for examples.
Setser argues SWFs are a distraction. SETSER REPORT, supra note 4, at 10.
66
Cf. Jamil Anderlini, Beijing Uses Forex Reserves to Target Taiwan, FT.com, Sept. 11, 2008, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/22fe798e-802c-11dd-99a9-000077b07658.html, (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
67
Richard Wachman, Gazprom Seeks to Build Empire Via European Utilities Stakes, THE OBSERVER, Jan.
28, 2007, at 2, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/jan/28/russia.
68
Helleiner & Lundblad, supra note 55.
65

16

DRAFT 09/22/08 COMMENTS WELCOME

interest-based groupings such as the IWG or its successor, horizontally linked with
established institutions such as the IMF, may chip away at standing general fora such as
the G-7, which seemed to run the institutions. It is ironic that if GAPP works, it could
both bolster the old institutional center with a new mission for the IMF, and validate new,
softer, more plural regulation with voluntary principles issued by an ad-hoc body.

Just as easily, the Santiago Principles could fail. They may turn out to be too vague or
too stingy to reassure the hosts, or too restrictive to bind a set of very diverse and very
rich actors whose interests often conflict. More likely, if the principles succeed at
fostering model corporate governance and transparency in SWFs, the (still-hypothetical)
threats that prompted GAPP may assume different form – shifting out of SWFs into
reserve pools, state-owned enterprises, or new vehicles as yet unknown. The GAPP
model would still be out there, but it would apply to an unimportant fringe of sovereign
finance.

It will be tempting to see GAPP as an exercise in technocratic legitimation – producing
dry, technical rules to help Chinese, Russian and Arab money look friendlier to their U.S.
and European hosts, while maintaining the mandate to invest from the masses at home. 69
This undersells the achievement. Whatever the outcome, GAPP implicates core
substantive issues and uses SWFs as catalysts to negotiate the terms of integration and
governance among different political, social and economic systems – Saudi Arabia,
Brazil, China and Norway, and their hosts in the United States, Europe and Africa.

SWFs are neither good nor bad. They may even turn out to be unimportant. But they are
a sign of things to come. International legal and financial systems need the capacity to
adjust accordingly.

69

Monk, supra note 18 at 4-6.
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